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Local Government Law
by Ken E. Jarrard*
I.

CONTRACTS

A.

Multiyear Agreements and ProprietaryFunctions
Georgia law provides, "One council may not, by an ordinance, bind
itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in matters of
municipal government."' "In addition to ordinances, the prohibition
applies to contracts entered into by municipalities."2 "To the extent that
a governmental contract impinges on a municipality's ability to legislate
freely, the contract is ultra vires and void."' This statute contains an
exception providing that the terms and conditions otherwise required for
a county or city to enter into a multiyear agreement do not apply with
respect to "contracts arising out of their proprietary functions." Little
guidance historically has existed regarding what constitutes a county's
or municipality's "proprietary" function within the confines of section 3660-13 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.).'

* Founding Partner of Jarrard & Davis, LLP, Cumming, Georgia. Middle Tennessee
State University (B.S., 1990); University of Tennessee, Knoxville (M.P.A., 1992; J.D., cum
laude, 1995). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
Special thanks to the following for their contributions: Larry W. Ramsey, Esq.; Paul B.
Frickey, Esq.; Elizabeth M. Whitworth, Esq.; Megan N. Martin, Esq.; Sarah B. VanVolkenburgh, Esq.; G. Aaron Meyer, Esq.; Jesse A. Van Sant, Esq.; and Jeffrey J. Costolnick, Esq.
1. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (2012).
2. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Stiles Apartments, Inc., 295 Ga. 829, 833,
764 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2014).
3. Id. at 833, 764 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting City of McDonough v. Campbell, 289 Ga. 216,
217, 710 S.E.2d 537, 538 (2011)).
4. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13(j) (2012 & Supp. 2015).
5. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
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The survey period from June 1, 2014 to May 31, 20156 witnessed a

degree of illumination on this critical issue. In Unified Government of
Athens-Clarke County v. Stiles Apartments, Inc.,' the Georgia Supreme

Court considered whether a multiyear contract providing that a parking
lot would be jointly constructed on private and public property for use
by the private party was ultra vires because it bound future councils.8
The court framed the pertinent issues as follows:
(1) Is the contract governmental in nature and hence subject to the
prohibition, or proprietary and hence not subject to the prohibition? (2)
If governmental in nature, is the contract subject to an exception? (3)
If not, is the contract subject to ratification and has it been ratified?
(4) If not, is the municipality estopped from relying on the statutory
prohibition?'
The court was persuaded that the underlying rationale for the parking

lot "was to relieve traffic congestion on a public street via the construction and maintenance of a sidewalk and parking area.""o The court,
relying on authority from 1968,11 held that the "construction and

maintenance of a street in a safe condition for travel are corporate/proprietary functions not subject to the prohibition against binding
successor councils." 2 Consequently, the supreme court held that the
multiyear agreement was not subject to the prohibition against binding
successor councils and was not, therefore, ultra vires.'3

B.

PlainLanguage of a Contract

Within that same vein, Jackson County v. Upper Oconee Basin Water
Authorityl4 serves as a strong admonition to review agreements

carefully to ensure that the obligations of the parties are clearly
identified, particularly within the realm of a long-term agreement where
conditions can change."

This warning is especially true within the

6. For an analysis of Georgia local government law during the prior survery period,
see Kirk Fjelstul, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66 MERCER L.
REV. 135 (2014).
7. 295 Ga. 829, 764 S.E.2d 403 (2014).
8. Id. at 832, 833, 764 S.E.2d at 407.
9. Id. at 833, 764 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting City of Powder Springs v. NMM Props., Inc.,
253 Ga. 753, 756-57, 325 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1985)).
10. Id.
11. Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968).
12. Stiles Apartments, 295 Ga. at 833, 764 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Phillips, 224 Ga. at
837, 165 S.E.2d at 143-44).
13. Id.
14. 330 Ga. App. 11, 766 S.E.2d 488 (2014), cert. applied for.
15. Id. at 14, 15, 16, 766 S.E.2d at 491, 492.
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context of intergovernmental agreements, which can last up to fifty
years.1 6 In Upper Oconee Basin Water Authority, the County entered
into a contract with the Water Authority allowing the County to
withdraw a maximum quantity of water equal to the "EPD approved
Established Yield."" The relevant contract defined Established Yield
of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental
Protection Division (EPD) to mean "the maximum rate of withdrawal
which can be sustained during critical dry periods as established by a
mathematical simulation of the reservoir operation as it would have
occurred during the worst historic drought for which applicable
streamflow records are available."18 Also, the agreement did not name
the party responsible for conducting the simulation or provide for when
the simulation should be conducted. The County claimed a right to force
a recalculation of the Established Yield with new drought data that was
not available at the time of the original agreement."
The court disagreed, determining such a right did not exist under the
plain language of the contract and that once the EPD approved the
initial Established Yield, there was no obligation to recalculate that
amount.2 0 The court concluded "the Agreement does not include a
provision requiring the Authority to conduct multiple simulations based
upon changing data," and, therefore, "the Authority could not be in
breach of an obligation to recalculate the Established Yield when such
an obligation does not exist under the plain language of the Agreement." 2 1

C.

Termination or No-Damage Clauses for Delays

22
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Effingham County v. Roach
confirmed that a practitioner must precisely articulate what delays and
causes for delays are intended to be enforceable and operational when
drafting termination or no-damages clauses because no relief will be
afforded to delays or their causes when not set forth with specificity.23
In Roach, the County entered into an agreement to bring water and
sewer services to a developer's property. The County never provided

16. Id. at 12, 766 S.E.2d at 490.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Upper Oconee Basin Water Auth. v. Jackson, 305 Ga. App. 409, 411,
699 S.E.2d 605, 607 (2010)).
19. Id. at 13, 766 S.E.2d at 491, 492.
20. Id. at 16, 766 S.E.2d at 492.
21. Id. at 15, 16, 766 S.E.2d at 492.
22. 329 Ga. App. 805, 764 S.E.2d 600 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (Nov. 20, 2014),
cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2015).
23. Id. at 815, 764 S.E.2d at 608.
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water or sewer service to the development and, instead, engaged in
protracted discussions with the City of Rincon about which governmental
entity would provide the service. The developer sued the County for
breach of contract.
The County based its primary contractual defense on the contract's
termination or no-damage clause, which provided:
In no event shall the County be held liable to the Developer for
consequential damages or economic losses arising from delayed
performance; provided, however, that in the event the County fails to
timely perform its obligations under this Agreement after written
notice of default from the Developer, then Developer shall be entitled
to complete the County's construction obligations hereunder . . . .25
The developer neither gave the described notice nor attempted to
complete the work.26 Nonetheless, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that the relevant contractual provision did not relieve the County from
liability.27
Relying on Department of ransportationv. Arapaho Construction,
Inc. ,28 the court held that "termination or no-damage clauses will not
be applied to delays or their causes not contemplated by the parties." 2 9
Furthermore, "such provisions . .. must be clear and unambiguous, [and]
specific in what they purport to cover."" Here, the developer "presented evidence suggesting that the delay in providing [water and sewer
utilities] to [the property] was caused, at least in part, by the County's
protracted discussions" with another city "about which governmental
entity was going to provide [water and sewer utilities] to [the property]."3 ' Because the termination or no-damage clause did not "specify

24. Id. at 805, 809, 764 S.E.2d at 603, 604.
25. Id. at 815, 764 S.E.2d at 608.
26.

Id.

27. Id. at 816, 764 S.E.2d at 608.
28. 257 Ga. 269, 357 S.E.2d 593 (1987).
29. Roach, 329 Ga. App. at 815, 764 S.E.2d at 608 (quotingArapho Contr., 257 Ga. at
270, 357 S.E.2d at 594).
30. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Arapaho Constr., 257 Ga. at 270, 357 S.E.2d
at 594). In Arapaho Construction, a bridge contractor overcame a no-damage contractual
provision with the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) that only authorized
termination when a court ordered injunction prevented the contractor from working on a
project. 257 Ga. at 270, 357 S.E.2d at 594. Because the GDOT attempted to utilize that
provision to terminate the contract when the GDOT had not secured necessary right-ofway, the supreme court held that the termination provision was not sufficiently specific
and unambiguous to cover the GDOT's failure to provide the bridge contractor with the
necessary right-of-way to conduct its work. Id.
31. Roach, 329 Ga. App. at 815-16, 764 S.E.2d at 608.
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this type of delay," the court of appeals determined that there was "an
issue of fact for the jury.""
II.

INSURANCE AND CONTRACTS

Ayers v. Ass'n of County Commissioners of Georgia-InterlocalRisk
Management Agency 33 involved a Stephens County deputy sheriff,
assigned to the Mountain Judicial Circuit Narcotics Criminal Investigation and Suppression Team (the NCIS Team), who shot and killed a
man. The NCIS Team was established in Stephens, Habersham, and
Georgia
Rabun Counties under intergovernmental agreements.
Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA) separately insured each
of the three counties under identical insurance policies. In an effort to
maximize the available insurance coverage, the plaintiff (the decedent's
spouse) claimed that each of the three insurance policies provided
separate coverage for the actions of the Stephens County deputy.3 4
In response, GIRMA filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment
that the insurance policy only applied to the Stephens County claims."
Applying the well-settled rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts
will be construed in favor of the insured (in this case, the deputy sheriff,
who would benefit from having more insurance coverage for the claim
against him), the court of appeals concluded that, due to the joint
creation and control of the NCIS Team by representatives of all counties,
the Stephens County deputy was, for insurance purposes, an "officer" of
all three counties and, thus, covered by all three GIRMA insurance
policies." While this case primarily involved construction of provisions
of insurance contracts, it serves as a reminder of the potential risks that
must be considered at the commencement of intergovernmental
arrangements involving the joint or shared use of personnel.
III.

TAXATION

Sales Involving Government Entities
In CPFInvestments, LLLP v. Fulton County Board of Assessors,17 the
Georgia Court of Appeals addressed whether a county board of assessors

A.

32. Id. at 816, 764 S.E.2d at 608.
33. 332 Ga. App. 230, 771 S.E.2d 743 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 583 (2015).
34. Id. at 230, 771 S.E.2d at 745.
35. Id. at 231, 771 S.E.2d at 745.
36. Id. at 235, 236, 771 S.E.2d at 748, 749. The court of appeals also held that the
language of the GIRMA policies did not prohibit stacking the insurance coverage under
those policies. Id. at 239-40, 771 S.E.2d at 750-51.
37. 330 Ga. App. 744, 769 S.E.2d 159 (2015).
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may treat sales involving governmental entities differently for valuation
purposes than for private party sales." The real property at issue
originally sold for $420,000 in 2002. It was subsequently purchased in
a 2010 foreclosure sale for $271,735, immediately conveyed to the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for the same
price, and finally sold to CPF Investments, LLLP (CPF) for $207,000 in
2011. Irrespective of the 2010 and 2011 sales prices, the County Board
of Assessors (Board) appraised the property at $370,400 for the 2012 tax
year." CPF appealed the appraisal to the superior court pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311,40 asserting that O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)41 required
the property to be appraised at the 2011 sales price for 2012.42 The
trial court disagreed, finding that the 2011 sale did not reflect the fair
market value of the subject property or qualify as an arm's length, bona
fide sale under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) because, as a government agency,
Freddie Mac's purchase and sale was not self-interested.43
In support of its position, CPF submitted an affidavit to the court,
stating that CPF and Freddie Mac were unaffiliated and the 2011 sale
was an arm's length transaction, entered into in good faith and without
fraud or deceit.4 The Board submitted its own affidavit, alleging that
governmental entities acted in the public's interest, rather than the
governmental entities' interest and that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5274,4 the Department of Revenue considers such sales invalid when
conducting its own ratio studies.4 ' Reversing and remanding the case
for summary judgment in favor of CPF, the court of appeals held that
the Board's allegations that governmental agency sales were not arm's
length, bona fide sales were unsupported by evidence and, therefore,
insufficient to rebut CPF's testimony that the sale was indeed at arm's
length and without fraud.
B.

Thirty-Day Deadline For Filing Ad Valorem Tax Appeals
In Dickey v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors,48 the court of
appeals continued to strictly apply the thirty-day deadline-which it first

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 746, 769 S.E.2d at 161.
Id. at 745, 769 S.E.2d at 160.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 (2010 & Supp. 2015).
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2010 & Supp. 2015).
CPFInv., LLLP, 330 Ga. App. at 745, 749, 769 S.E.2d at 160, 162.
Id. at 746, 769 S.E.2d at 160, 161.
Id. at 745, 769 S.E.2d at 160.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-274 (2010 & Supp. 2015).
CPF Inv., LLLP, 330 Ga. App. at 747-48, 769 S.E.2d at 161-62.
Id. at 749, 750, 769 S.E.2d at 163.
333 Ga. App. 345, 776 S.E.2d 480 (2015), reconsiderationdenied (July 21, 2015).
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established in Webb v. Board of Tax Assessors of Madison County"-for
filing ad valorem tax appeals under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311.50 Pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2), appeals from county board of equalization
(BOE) decisions shall be made by filing and mailing written notice of
appeal with the county board of assessors "within 30 days from the date
on which the decision of the [BOE], hearing officer, or arbitor is
Notice of the BOE decision shall be mailed to each
delivered.""
party5 2 and, pursuant to the pre-2015 version of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(o),
notice shall also be served upon the taxpayer's attorney.1 3
In Dickey, the taxpayer filed notice of appeal from the BOE decision
thirty-three days after the decision letter had been mailed to her. The
County Board of Assessors (Board) moved for summary judgment
because the taxpayer's failure to timely file notice of appeal deprived the
court of jurisdiction. The taxpayer argued that the time period for filing
a notice of appeal was merely directory and, in the alternative, the
thirty-day limitations period was inapplicable because the BOE failed to
provide notice of its decision to the taxpayer's authorized representative,
Property Tax Advisers, LLC (PTA)."
The trial court granted summary judgment to the Board and the court
of appeals affirmed, holding that the "statutory limitation on the period
of time in which an appeal from a judicial decision may be taken is
jurisdictional" and further noting that PTA was not a law firm and did
not employ any licensed attorneys." It is manifest in O.C.G.A. § 48-5311 that the legislature intended to create a clear distinction between a
non-lawyer representative and an attorney because this code section
specifically authorizes non-attorney representatives to appear before the
BOE and make proof of service of a notice of appeal to the county board
of assessors,5 6 whereas O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(o) required the notice be
served only upon the taxpayer's attorney, omitting any reference to the
taxpayer's representatives or employees.

49. 142 Ga. App. 784, 236 S.E.2d 925 (1977).
50. Dickey, 383 Ga. App. at 347, 776 S.E.2d at 481.
51. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2).
52. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(6)(D)(i).
53. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(o) (2010).
54. Dickey, 333 Ga. App. at 346-47, 347, 776 S.E.2d at 481.
55. Id. at 347, 776 S.E.2d at 481 (quoting Webb, 142 Ga. App. at 784, 236 S.E.2d at
725).
56. See O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(6)(A).
57. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(o) (pre-2015 amendment stating that "actions shall instead be
provided to such attorney").
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IMMUNITY

Statutory Immunity

In Wyno v. Lowndes County," the Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether statutory immunity provided by the Responsible Dog
Ownership Law (RDO)" contravened article I, section 2, paragraph 9(d)
of the Georgia Constitution6 0 through the immunity granted to county
employees in their official capacity for the negligent performance of a
ministerial duty.61 In Wyno, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against
Lowndes County and four county animal control officers after his
neighbor's unrestrained and "habitually loose" dog attacked and killed
his wife.62 The plaintiff alleged that the county employees previously
responded to multiple complaints that the neighbor's dogs "growled and
lunged at children and adults ... [and] bit a child in the face," but that
the county employees negligently failed to take any action against the
owner.6 3 The plaintiff contended that the animal control officers'
failure to perform their ministerial duties, which included enforcing
state and local animal control laws, internal policies, and other duties,
worked as a waiver of official immunity. Additionally, the plaintiff
argued that the RDO statutory immunity was in derogation of the
Georgia Constitution article I, section 2, paragraph 9(d) to the extent
that it grants immunity to county employees in their official capacity for
the negligent performance of a ministerial duty. Upon motion by the
County, the trial court dismissed all claims against the governmental
defendants in their official and individual capacities, finding the claims
were barred by sovereign immunity, official immunity, and, in the
alternative, by statutory immunity under the RDO.6 4
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims
against the County and the employees in their official capacity under the
RDO." Despite the qualification the immunity applies to claims for
"failing to enforce the provisions of this article," the court held that,
based on the introductory statement of legislative intent, the immunity
applied to all local government officials and employees for injuries

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

331 Ga. App. 541, 771 S.E.2d 207 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 465 (2015).
O.C.G.A. §§ 4-8-20 to -33 (2010 & Supp. 2015).
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d).
Wyno, 331 Ga. App. at 543, 771 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 541, 543, 771 S.E.2d at 208, 209.
Id. at 543, 771 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 543, 546, 771 S.E.2d at 209, 211.
Id. at 542, 771 S.E.2d at 208.
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inflicted by dangerous dogs." However, the court did not reach the
most interesting aspect of Wyno-that is, the extent to which the RDO
may have provided a de facto immunity to county employees where there
may have otherwise been an official immunity waiver. The plaintiff
argued that if the RDO provided a de facto immunity where the Georgia
Constitution otherwise afforded none, the RDO must be held unconstitutional.6 7 The outcome of that question will have to wait for another day
because the court of appeals remanded the case back to the trial court
to enter a specific order on this issue and to determine the outcome of
the individual capacity claims against the animal control officers."
B.

Official Immunity

In Williams v. Pauley,69 the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed the
official immunity defense within the context of a police officer's effort to
impound a stray horse from the roadway." In Williams, the defendant,
a county police officer, responded to a 911 call reporting a horse was
loose on the highway. Because he had no assistance, the officer was not
able to confine or otherwise corral the horse on his own. When the
officer left the scene to seek assistance, the horse strayed onto the
highway, causing a fatal collision. There were no protocols or instructions guiding officers on how to deal with a stray horse, or other
livestock, that posed a potential vehicular hazard."
The decedent's husband brought a wrongful death claim against the
officer in his individual capacity. The officer filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting official immunity as a complete bar to the claim."
The trial court denied the officer's motion, finding that prior to a court's
ruling on the question of immunity, the jury should resolve "genuine
issue[s] of material fact. . . on whether or not [the officer] attempted to
take action or simply took no action at all."7
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the action was
barred by official immunity because the record was clear that the
officer's actions in attempting to remove the horse were discretionary,
requiring the officer "to exercise personal deliberation and judgment to

66. Id. at 544, 771 S.E.2d at 210.
67. Id. at 546, 771 S.E.2d at 211.
68. Id.
69. 331 Ga. App. 129, 768 S.E.2d 546 (2015), reconsiderationdenied (Mar. 12, 2015),
cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 385 (2015).
70. Id. at 129-30, 768 S.E.2d at 547.
71. Id. at 131, 132, 133, 768 S.E.2d at 547, 548, 549.
72. Id. at 129, 130, 768 S.E.2d at 547.
73. Id. at 133, 768 S.E.2d at 549 (ellipsis in original) (quoting the trial court).
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'

reach reasoned conclusions about how to accomplish a task for which
there were no specific directions."7 4 Although O.C.G.A. § 4-3-4(a)"
required the officer to impound the stray horse, it lacked specific
instructions for accomplishing the task and, therefore, the statutory
mandate to remove the horse did not render the officer's actions
ministerial.
Cooley v. Bryant7 is among the rare cases where, for the purpose of
official immunity, the lack of a written policy was not determinative of
whether an act was ministerial or discretionary." In Cooley, an inmate
at the Muscogee County Prison was injured while cutting grass at a park
in connection with an inmate work detail. The supervisor in charge of
the work detail was a correctional officer responsible for overseeing
inmates and inspecting the equipment to ensure it was operational.
While no written policy governed such inspections, the record contained
evidence that the Parks and Recreation Department had an unwritten
policy requiring correctional officers to take defective equipment to the
shop when maintenance was required. On the day of the incident, the
mower's safety lever, which normally required the operator to manually
hold the lever to keep the mower running, had been disconnected.7 9 As
the inmate was mowing, the mower "hit a hole, dug into the ground, and
flipped up sideways," causing serious injuries.o
The inmate filed suit against the work-detail supervisor individually
and in his official capacity for negligent inspection and maintenance of
the mower. The supervisor filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing, inter alia, that the individual capacity claims against him were
barred by the doctrine of official immunity. The trial court denied the
supervisor's motion, finding that the inspection and maintenance of the
lawnmower was a ministerial duty, and, therefore, the inmate's claims
were not barred by official immunity.8
On appeal, the supervisor argued that his duty to inspect and
maintain the mower was discretionary rather than ministerial-thus
entitling him to official immunity-because no written policy governed
how he conducted inspections. However, both the supervisor and the
director of the Department of Parks and Recreation agreed that an

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 4-3-4(a) (2013).
Williams, 331 Ga. App. at 134, 768 S.E.2d at 549.
331 Ga. App. 718, 771 S.E.2d 411 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 522 (2015).
Id. at 718, 771 S.E.2d at 412-13.
Id. at 718, 719, 722, 771 S.E.2d at 412, 413, 415.
Id. at 719-20, 771 S.E.2d at 413.
Id. at 720, 771 S.E.2d at 413-14.
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unwritten policy existed, requiring the supervisor to take faulty mowers
to the shop for repairs upon becoming aware of any defects. 2 Citing
this unwritten policy, the court noted that "if the jury concludes that
[the supervisor] was aware of [any] defect, then the unwritten department policy merely dictated that he complete a simple task: that is, to
take the lawnmower to the maintenance shop for repair."" In that
event, the court held that the duty to take the lawnmower to the shop
for repairs would be transformed into a ministerial duty and, thus,
defeat the supervisor's entitlement to official immunity." The case was
remanded for a jury to determine whether the supervisor was aware of
the relevant defects."
C.

Sovereign Immunity

The court in GeorgiaDepartment of Correctionsv. Couch" considered
whether the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)," under the "offer of
settlement" provision, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(2), 88 impliedly waived the
sovereign immunity of the Georgia Department of Corrections (Department) in connection with attorney fees awarded to an inmate." In
Couch, an inmate's lawsuit proceeded to trial after the Department
rejected the inmate's offer to settle his tort action for $24,000. A jury
then returned a verdict in favor of the inmate in the amount of
$105,417, and, therefore, the trial court awarded attorney fees pursuant
to the "offer of settlement" provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(2). 9 0
In upholding the award of attorney fees, the Georgia Supreme Court
observed that "[ilmplied waivers of governmental immunity should not
be favored," but noted, nonetheless, that "[t]his does not mean. . . that
the Legislature must use specific 'magic words' such as 'sovereign
immunity is hereby waived' in order to create a specific statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity." 9 ' Additionally, the court noted that the "clear
purpose" of the attorney fees provisions in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b) was "to
encourage litigants in tort cases to make and accept good faith settlement proposals in order to avoid unnecessary litigation," thereby

82. Id. at 722, 771 S.E.2d at 415.
83. Id. at 723, 771 S.E.2d at 416.
84. Id. at 723, 771 S.E.2d at 415-16.
85. Id. at 723, 771 S.E.2d at 416.
86. 295 Ga. 469, 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 11, 2014).
87. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2013 & Supp. 2014).
88. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(2) (2015).
89. Couch, 295 Ga. at 469, 759 S.E.2d at 806.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 473-74, 759 S.E.2d at 809 (alterations in original) (quoting Colon, 294 Ga. at
95, 751 S.E.2d at 310).
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advancing the "strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and
settlements."9 2
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court
stated, "While payments of attorney fees and litigation expenses under
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b) are not made as compensation for a tort 'claim,'
they are made as an incident of a party's inappropriate conduct in the
underlying tort action.""
In Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Winter,"
the court of appeals examined what written communications suffice to
form a written contract that sovereign immunity does not bar an action
thereunder." Winter, a British citizen, engaged in extensive correspondence with representatives of the University of Georgia regarding postdoctorate employment in the College of Veterinary Medicine. That
correspondence included a written formal offer of employment, as well
as emails from a University of Georgia representative stating she was
glad Winter chose to join their laboratory. Winter executed several
documents associated with such employment, including an intellectual
property agreement. Ultimately, Winter was unable to secure an
appropriate visa from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
and the University of Georgia informed Winter that it was withdrawing
its "offer" of employment for that reason. Winter then filed suit for
breach of contract.96 The trial court denied the Board of Regents'
motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed, holding
that sovereign immunity barred Winter's claims.
Noting that both the Georgia Constitution and statutory law provide
that the state's sovereign immunity is waived for breach of written
contract actions," the court of appeals held that no such written
contract existed here." First, "[t]he parties clearly did not enter into
00
a formal, traditional written agreement that both parties signed."
Next, the court examined whether the parties "entered into signed
contemporaneous writings sufficient to establish a written contract."o
The court stated that a nine-week delay between the written offer of

92. Id. at 470-71, 759 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 29, 694
S.E.2d 83, 88 (2010)).
93. Id. at 476, 759 S.E.2d at 811 (emphasis in original).
94. 331 Ga. App. 528, 771 S.E.2d 201 (2015).
95. Id. at 532, 771 S.E.2d at 205 (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity defined by
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c)).
96. Id. at 528-29, 531, 771 S.E.2d at 203, 204.
97. Id. at 531, 535, 771 S.E.2d at 204, 207.
98. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c); see also O.C.G.A. § 50-21-1(a) (2013).
99. Winter, 331 Ga. App. at 532-33, 771 S.E.2d at 205.
100. Id. at 532, 771 S.E.2d at 205.
101. Id. at 532-33, 771 S.E.2d at 205.
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employment and Winter's signing of various new-employee documentation "strongly suggests that those documents are not contemporaneous."102 In addition, the court concluded that the later written documents related to a "completely separate activity"-the finalization of
administrative details related to Winter's employment-rather than the
memorialization of an agreement for employment in the first place.os
In City of Atlanta v. Mitcham,'04 the Georgia Supreme Court provided a primer on several core concepts of local government law, including
the differing sovereign immunity standards for counties and cities, and
the often-conflated concepts of ministerial functions and ministerial
duties.' 05 Mitcham brought a negligence action against the City of
Atlanta and its police chief in his official capacity, claiming that
Mitcham was injured as a result of the City's failure to monitor his
diabetic condition while he was an inmate in the city jail. The trial
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity
grounds.'
Relying largely on Cantrell v. Thurman,o7 the court of
appeals affirmed the denial of that motion, holding that pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b),'o "the provision of medical care to inmates ...
was a ministerial act and, because it was a ministerial act, sovereign
immunity was waived . . . ."109In reversing the court of appeals, the
supreme court pointed out the differing constitutional sources for
municipal and county sovereign immunity." 0 Where Cantrell dealt
with the sovereign immunity provision found in article I, section 2,
paragraph 9(c) of the Georgia Constitution,"' the "municipal corporations are protected by sovereign immunity pursuant . . . [to] Article IX,
Section II, Paragraph IX, unless that immunity is waived by the General
Assembly.11 2 Such a waiver by the General Assembly is found in

102. Id. at 533, 771 S.E.2d at 206.
103. Id. at 534, 771 S.E.2d at 206.
104. 296 Ga. 576, 769 S.E.2d 320 (2015).
105. See id. at 582, 582-83, 769 S.E.2d at 326.
106. Id. at 576, 771 S.E.2d at 322.
107. 231 Ga. App. 510, 499 S.E.2d 416 (1998), overruled in part by Tattnall Cnty. v.
Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. 46, 51, 775 S.E.2d 573, 575 (2015).
108. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 (2012).
109. Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 576-77, 769 S.E.2d at 323 (quoting City of Atlanta v.
Mitcham, 325 Ga. App. 481, 484, 751 S.E.2d 598, 601 (2013)).
110. Id. at 581-82, 789 S.E.2d at 325.
111. See GA. CONsT. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e): "Except as specifically provided in this
Paragraph, sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and
agencies." Id. The supreme court has held that counties constitute "departments [or]
agencies" of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Richardson,
264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
112. Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 577, 769 S.E.2d at 322-23.
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O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b), and the court stated, "This provision has for more
than a century been interpreted to mean that municipal corporations are
immune from liability for acts taken in performance of a governmental
function but may be liable for the negligent performance of their
ministerial duties."1 1 3
Without providing any further clarification on the general test, the
supreme court noted that the appellate courts have frequently held the
operation of a jail, and the care and treatment of inmates, "are purely
governmental functions," and "there can be no action for damages
against a municipal corporation for its failure to provide medical care to
an inmate regardless of the presence of negligence."'1 4
In SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Board of Assessors, 1 5 the
supreme court took an additional look at sovereign immunity in the post
Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable
Coast116 era.1 1 ' At issue in SJN Properties was the legality of the
Development Authority of Fulton County's sale-leaseback transaction
wherein the Development Authority would receive title, the private
entity entering into a lease for the property, and, for taxation purposes,
the leasehold estate's assessment using a "50% ramp-up valuation
method." 1 s The plaintiff pursued claims seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief with respect to the subject transaction."'
The supreme court had little difficulty determining that the plaintiff's
claim for injunctive relief was barred by sovereign immunity.2 o
However, the plaintiff's claim with respect to mandamus and declaratory
relief required further exploration.1 21 With respect to mandamus, the
supreme court held that the action was viable and not precluded by
summary judgment.1 22 Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, the court
determined the plaintiff's mandamus claim would not survive summary
judgment." 3

113. Id. at 577-78, 769 S.E.2d at 323.
114. Id. at 580, 769 S.E.2d at 324, 325. While concluding that sovereign immunity bars
such claims against municipal corporations, the court noted that inadequate medical
treatment to persons in governmental custody may be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012). Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 580 n.4, 769 S.E.2d at 325 n.4.
115. 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
116. 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).
117. SJN Properties, 296 Ga. at 798-99, 770 S.E.2d at 837.
118. Id. at 797, 770 S.E.2d at 836.
119. Id. at 795, 770 S.E.2d at 835.
120. Id. at 798, 770 S.E.2d at 837.
121. Id. at 799, 770 S.E.2d at 837-38.
122. Id. at 799, 770 S.E.2d at 837; see also S. LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 290 Ga. 204,
205, 719 S.E.2d 473, 473 (2011).
123. SJN Properties, 296 Ga. at 802, 770 S.E.2d at 839.

2015]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

161

Of greater interest with respect to the current state of sovereign
immunity, the court spent time reviewing the plaintiff's claim for
declaratory relief.124 As a threshold matter, the court noted it "previously left unresolved the question of whether sovereign immunity
generally bars claims against the State for declaratory relief."l25
Although SJN Propertiesdid not conclusively resolve whether sovereign
immunity bars a declaratory judgment claim, the case did provide
tantalizing hints where the supreme court is headed: "Under the
rationale of Sustainable Coast, it appears that, absent a statutory
provision affording claimants an express right to seek declaratory relief
against the State, sovereign immunity would bar such claims."1 26
In Primas v. City of Milledgeville,2 7 the supreme court considered
whether the court of appeals adhered to the appropriate standards and
legal constructs in determining whether the City of Milledgeville enjoyed
sovereign immunity on certain claims.1 2 8 The plaintiff, Primas, was
a corrections officer who was allegedly injured when the prison workdetail van he was driving collided with a utility pole after the brakes
failed. The City of Milledgeville leased the van to the Georgia Department of Corrections. Pursuant to the lease agreement, the City was
responsible for maintaining the vehicle. The plaintiff sued the City,
alleging negligence for failure to inspect and maintain the vehicle's
brakes. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that maintenance of the brakes was a "discretionary act" on which it had not waived
its sovereign immunity.1 29 The trial court denied the City's motion and
the court of appeals reversed. 8 o
It is well established that "a municipal corporation is immune from
suit unless its immunity is waived by the General Assembly"; yet, the
waiver of a municipal corporation's sovereign immunity only subjects the
municipal corporation to suit for the negligent performance of "ministerial functions," while immunity remains for actions taken in the course of
its "governmental functions.""a' This sovereign immunity is a separate
and distinct analysis from that of official immunity, which considers

124. Id. at 802-03, 770 S.E.2d at 839-40.
125. Id. at 802, 770 S.E.2d at 839.
126. Id. (citing Ga. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga.
593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014)).
127. 296 Ga. 584, 769 S.E.2d 326 (2015).
128. Id. at 584, 769 S.E.2d at 327.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 584, 769 S.E.2d at 327-28.
131. Id. at 584, 769 S.E.2d at 328 (discussing immunity set out in O.C.G.A. § 36-331(b)).
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"discretionary" and "ministerial" acts.1 32 The court of appeals, though
apparently recognizing the principles of official immunity, erred in its
application of these principles by incorrectly stating the City waived
sovereign immunity for "ministerial acts, but not for discretionary
acts."'"' Consequently, the supreme court held the court of appeals
"applied inapplicable legal principles, definitions, and precedent," and
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under
34
the proper legal analysis.1

V.

ANTE-LITEM NOTICE

In Warnell v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County,'"' the
plaintiffs made a novel (though ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to
circumvent the consequences of the their failure to comply with O.C.G.A.
§ 36-11-1,136 which requires the plaintiffs to present timely ante-litem
notice to the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County (County).1'3 Warnell involved a car accident between the plaintiffs and a
County police officer. The County purchased a liability insurance policy
on the officer's patrol car with a $1 million limit, but the plaintiffs did
not file suit against the County until twenty-two months after the
accident. It was undisputed that the plaintiffs failed to provide written
notice of their claims to the County within twelve months of their
accrual.
The County moved for summary judgment, arguing the
plaintiffs' claims against the County were barred by their failure to
present them to the County within twelve months as required by
O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1.138
The plaintiffs argued the County was barred from raising the antelitem defense because the County purchased liability insurance, which
thus implicated the O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51139 statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.1 4 0 The plaintiffs contended that within the context of
motor vehicle claims, if a county purchased liability insurance such that
sovereign immunity is waived, then the county's only defenses are those
of a private party and the county forfeits an ante-litem defense.14' The

132.
347-50,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 585, 769 S.E.2d at 328; see also Heller v. City of Atlanta, 290 Ga. App. 345,
659 S.E.2d 617, 620-22 (2008).
Primas, 296 Ga. at 584-85, 769 S.E.2d at 328.
Id. at 585, 586, 769 S.E.2d at 328.
328 Ga. App. 903, 763 S.E.2d 284 (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 (2012).
Warnell, 328 Ga. App. at 904, 763 S.E.2d at 286; see also O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1.
Warnell, 328 Ga. App. at 903-04, 763 S.E.2d at 285-86.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2013).
Warnell, 328 Ga. App. at 904, 763 S.E.2d at 286.
Id. at 905, 763 S.E.2d at 287.
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court of appeals was unimpressed. The court emphasized the express
statutory requirement found in O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1: "[allclaims against
counties must be presented within 12 months after they accrue or become
payable or the same are barred."14 2 The court simply could not get
comfortable with the nature of the mandatory notice-of-claim requirement. 1 43

In City of College Park v. Sekisui SPR Americas, LLC,'" the court
of appeals disapproved its decision in Jacks v. City of Atlanta' and
held that a municipality cannot raise a lack of ante-litem notice as a
defense to a subcontractor's claim against the municipality for failure to
comply with O.C.G.A. § 36-91-90146 by obtaining appropriate payment
bonds.' 4 ' The City hired the plaintiff to work on a sewer project, and
the plaintiff sued the City when the general contractor failed to pay the
subcontractor for work performed. The subcontractor maintained that
the City was liable for violating O.C.G.A. § 36-91-90 because the City
failed to ensure the general contractor had obtained a payment bond.
The subcontractor raised additional claims as well. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the court granted the
plaintiff's motion."
On appeal, the City contended, among other
things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss based
upon a lack of ante-litem notice under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5,'14 relying
heavily on the court's decision in Jacks."'o Interestingly in Sekisui, the
court disapproved of the holding in Jacks to the extent it held that
claims arising under O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91151 are subject to the antelitem notice requirement in O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.152 The court reasoned
that "the plain text of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 . . . applies only to tort claims
relating to personal injury and property damage." 5 3

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 904,763 S.E.2d at 286 (alterations in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1).
Id. at 904-05, 763 S.E.2d at 286.
331 Ga. App. 404, 771 S.E.2d 101 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 471 (2015).
284 Ga. App. 200, 644 S.E.2d 150 (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-90 (2012).
Sekisui, 331 Ga. App. at 407-08, 771 S.E.2d at 104.
Id. at 404-05, 405, 771 S.E.2d at 102.
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
Sekisui, 331 Ga. App. at 406, 408, 771 S.E.2d at 103-04, 104.
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91 (2012).
Sekisui, 331 Ga. App. at 408, 771 S.E.2d at 104.
Id.
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ROADS AND BRIDGES

Despite the "peculiar factual circumstances" at issue in City ofAtlanta
v. Kovalcik,'5 4 the case is worth noting for its discussion of the interplay between the liability that can arise from a city's negligent breach
of its "duty to maintain safe streets" and the immunity a city enjoys in
exercising "its discretion in providing lighting on those streets.""' In
Kovalcik, the City of Atlanta appealed the denial of its motion for
summary judgment in a wrongful death action brought by the parents
of a woman who died in a nighttime car accident at a newly reconfigured

intersection in the city.1 6 While the City acknowledged that a municipal corporation, as a matter of general law, can be liable for the
negligent failure to "keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition," the City cited Roquemore v. City of Forsyths7 for the

proposition that "the mere absence of an ordinary street light at a given
point will not constitute such negligence as to render the city liable if
the city otherwise has performed its obligation to keep the streets safe
In Roquemore, however, the Georgia Suand free from defects.""
preme Court carefully noted that the city lacked "actual or constructive
notice" of the malfunctioning street light at issue,'
whereas in
Kovalcik there was evidence that the City "knew or should have known"
that lighting was necessary at the roadway in question even though it

154. 329 Ga. App. 523, 526, 765 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2014), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS
115 (2015).
155. Id. at 525, 765 S.E.2d at 695. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 provides, "[It is the public policy
of the State of Georgia that there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity of municipal
corporations of the state and such municipal corporations shall be immune from liability
for damages." O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a) (2012). However, there is waiver of a municipal
corporation's sovereign immunity provided in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 which
states "[m]unicipal corporations shall not be liable for failure to perform or for errors in
performing their legislative or judicial powers. For neglect to perform or improper or
unskillful performance of their ministerial duties, they shall be liable." O.C.G.A. § 36-331(b) (2012). This provision has, for more than a century, been interpreted to mean the
municipal corporations are immune from liability for acts taken in performance of a
governmental function, but may be liable for the negligent performance of their ministerial
duties. See Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 362-63, 191 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1972). The
function of the municipality in maintaining its streets and sidewalks to keep them safe for
travel in ordinary modes is a ministerial function. Hammock v. City Council of Augusta,
83 Ga. App. 217, 217-18, 63 S.E.2d 290, 291 (1951).
156. Kovalcik, 329 Ga. App. at 523, 765 S.E.2d at 693.
157. 274 Ga. App. 420, 617 S.E.2d 644 (2005).
158. Kovalcik, 329 Ga. App. at 525, 765 S.E.2d at 695 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Roquemore v. City of Forsyth, 274 Ga. App. 420, 422, 617 S.E.2d at 644, 646 (2005).
159. Roquemore, 274 Ga. App. at 423, 617 S.E.2d at 647.
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Thus, in view of the "unusual circumstanc-

es" Kovalcik presented, the court held that the absence of lighting "could

'

be considered as evidence on the issue of whether, at the time and place
of the crash, the newly constructed intersection was being maintained
in a reasonably safe condition."1 6
VI.
A.

TAKINGS

Condemnation

Dillard Land Investments, LLC v. Fulton Countyl6 2 involved a
county's use of the "special master" method of condemnation to acquire

property for public library facilities.1 6 '

The trial court appointed a

special master who filed an award that found the market value of the
property. However, instead of paying the awarded amount into the
registry of the court, the County promptly filed a voluntary dismissal of
the action.
In response, the property owner moved to vacate the

voluntary dismissal, arguing that the County lacked authority to
unilaterally dismiss the action once the special master entered the value

award.

Although the trial court agreed with the property owner, the

court of appeals reversed, holding that the special master's award was

not final until adopted by the trial judge and therefore the County could
unilaterally dismiss the action before entry of a final order." The
Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, resolving the dispute in the
5
property owner's favor.16
The supreme court reasoned that a condemning authority cannot
unilaterally dismiss a condemnation action once the special master
renders an award, even if a court has not yet entered the special
master's award via a final order."' The supreme court noted that a
trial court lacks discretion to alter a special master's award since the

&

160. Kovalcik, 329 Ga. App. at 526-27, 765 S.E.2d at 695-96.
161. Id. at 526-27, 765 S.E.2d at 696.
162. 295 Ga. 515, 761 S.E.2d 282 (2014).
163. Id. at 515-16, 761 S.E.2d at 284; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 22-2-100 to -114 (1982
Supp. 2015). The special master method constitutes one of three primary statutory
methods by which a local government may condemn property using the power of eminent
domain. The other methods are the "declaration of taking" method, codified at O.C.G.A.
§§ 32-3-1 to -20 (2012 & Supp. 2015), and the lesser-used "assessors" method, codified at
O.C.G.A. §§ 22-2-1 to -86 (1982 & Supp. 2015).
164. Dillard, 295 Ga. at 521, 761 S.E.2d at 288.
165. Id. at 515, 761 S.E.2d at 283-84.
166. Id. at 522, 761 S.E.2d at 288.

166

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

relevant statute directs that a court "shall" enter an award in the
amount provided by the special master.16 7
B.

Inverse Condemnation

In the context of inverse condemnation, the court of appeals held in
Pennington v. Gwinnett County'6 that an option to lease property does

not represent a property interest that could be taken and, thus, the
County owed no compensation for interfering with the option's value.16 1
Over a decade prior in Five Forks, LLC v. Department of Transporta-

tion,wo the court of appeals was asked to resolve the question of how
(or whether) to value an option to purchase property.17' However, the
court never reached the question because the option expired two years
prior to the condemnation and "losses occurring to property before the
actual date of taking are not compensable in direct condemnation
actions." 72
The property owners in Pennington entered into an option contract
with a cellular service provider to lease a portion of their property for a
cell tower. After extending the lease option several times, the service
provider eventually declined to exercise the option when the County
changed its policies to allow cell towers on county-owned property. The
property owners sued the County, arguing that the County's change in
policy confiscated the value of their option, which thereby constituted a
taking by inverse condemnation.7 3 According to the appellate court,
however, the owners could not recover for the loss of this "contingent,
future right." 7 4 As the owners merely had an expectation of a lease
rather than a lease itself, it followed that they had no compensable
property right to be taken by the County.17

167. Id. at 521, 761 S.E.2d at 288; see also O.C.G.A. § 22-2-111 (1982) ("Upon the entry
of the award of the special master and the presentation of the award to the judge of the
superior court, the judge shall enter a proper order and judgment of the court condemning
the described property or other interest in rem to the use of the condemnor." (emphasis
added)).
168. 329 Ga. App. 255, 764 S.E.2d 860 (2014).
169. Id. at 257, 764 S.E.2d at 862.
170. 250 Ga. App. 157, 550 S.E.2d 715 (2001).
171. Id. at 157, 550 S.E.2d at 716.
172. Id. at 159, 159-60, 550 S.E.2d at 717, 717-18 (quoting Josh Cabaret, Inc. v. Dep't
of Transp., 256 Ga. 749, 749, 353 S.E.2d 346, 346 (1987)).
173. Pennington, 329 Ga. App. at 255-56, 257, 764 S.E.2d at 861, 862.
174. Id. at 257, 764 S.E.2d at 862.
175. Id. at 257-58, 764 S.E.2d at 862.
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STORMWATER AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Statute of Limitations

'

In Liberty County v. Eller,'7 1 the court of appeals considered the
appropriate date for commencing the statute of limitations in an inverse
condemnation claim.1 7 7 The court first looked to whether the underlying condition allegedly giving rise to the inverse condemnation constitutFinding no
ed a continuing, as opposed to permanent, nuisance.17
evidence of any lack of required maintenance on the pipe draining water
from the county road to the pond, the court determined the underlying
nuisance was permanent in nature and, therefore, the pertinent date for
79
the statute of limitations was the date of installation of the pipe.
The court also considered whether "some new harm that was not
previously observable" had occurred within the four-year statute of
limitations window preceding the filing of the lawsuit.' 80 Concluding
there was no evidence of "any change in the run-off or discharge from
the drain pipe after it was installed," the court held that the four-year
statue of limitations barred the plaintiffs' claim.' 8
B.

Res Judicata

In DeKalb County v. Heath,'8 2 the court considered whether the
doctrine of res judicata barred the plaintiff's inverse condemnation
claim. 8 1 In a prior action, the plaintiff obtained a jury verdict against
the County for diminished property value based on the County's failure
to properly maintain a stream bed, which constituted part of the
County's sewer and storm water drainage system on the plaintiff's
While the previous action was pending, the County
property.' 84

176. 327 Ga. App. 770, 761 S.E.2d 164 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 695 (2014).
177. Id. at 770-74, 761 S.E.2d at 166-68. In Eller, the County installed a pipe draining
water from a county road to an existing private pond in 2001. The plaintiffs purchased the
property in 2008 and, three or four months after purchasing the property, noticed that the
pipe was filling the pond with storm water when it rained. The plaintiffs filed suit in 2011,
claiming damages as a result of the storm water discharged from the pipe. Id. at 770, 771,
761 S.E.2d at 166.
178. Id. at 772, 761 S.E.2d at 168.
179. Id. at 773, 761 S.E.2d at 168.
180. Id. at 773-74, 761 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Forrister, 289
Ga. 331, 336, 711 S.E.2d 641, 645 (2011)).
181. Id. at 774, 761 S.E.2d at 168-69.
182. 331 Ga. App. 179, 770 S.E.2d 269 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 424 (2015).
183. Id. at 181, 770 S.E.2d at 271.
184. Id. at 180, 770 S.E.2d at 271.
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installed a retaining wall along the creek bed "for the purpose of
preventing erosion to his property in connection with the storm water
drainage system" and it failed.'"' The plaintiff filed another action
against the County, alleging the County was responsible for the
improper construction and maintenance of the wall. After a bench trial,
the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the County
argued that the doctrine of res judicata barred this subsequent inverse
condemnation claim based on a failing retaining wall in light of the
result in the previous case based on the streambed maintenance. 86
The appellate court held that the two inverse condemnation claims were
based on continuing (as opposed to permanent) nuisances and that the
latter claim "involved a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action would
lie."
C.

Ownership and Maintenance
In City of Atlanta v. Demita,8 8 the court of appeals addressed a
property owner's inverse condemnation claim against the City for storm
water damage based on the City's ownership of the road from which
water flowed on the plaintiff's property.8 9 In Demita, the plaintiff
contended that "the street itself, which the City owns and maintains,
constitutes a sewer or drainage system" and that the City was "liable for
maintaining a nuisance to any property owner who .

.

. owns property

adjacent to a low point on a street where water collects and repeatedly
overflows the curbing, floods that adjacent property, and causes damage
there."19 o Unimpressed with this analysis, the court of appeals found
that, "[s]uch an expansive definition of maintaining a sewer or drainage
system is not consistent with Georgia jurisprudence," and instead
determined the record was devoid of "evidence that the City negligently
constructed or maintained a sewer or drainage system under its

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 182, 770 S.E.2d at 272.
188. 329 Ga. App. 33, 762 S.E.2d 436 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (Sept. 9, 2014),
cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 971 (2014).
189. Id. at 35-36, 762 S.E.2d at 439. The court noted that the City had not installed
any drainage facilities on the road and the only aspect of "drainage" constructed by the
City was a crown in the center of the road. Id. at 36, 762 S.E.2d at 439-40. Years after
construction of the road, the developer added a gutter along the road in front of the
plaintiffs property when their house was constructed. Id.
190. Id. at 36, 37, 762 S.E.2d at 440.
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The court reversed the trial court's denial of a directed

verdict in favor of the City. 1 9 2
IX.

ORDINANCE INTERPRETATION

The case of Golden Isles Outdoor, LLC v. Lamar Co., LLC' 9" involved
judicial construction of a city's sign ordinance where two outdoor sign
companies fought to acquire the last of two available digital billboard
permits, and each company proposed a different interpretation of the
One company argued that, in spite of ordinance
sign ordinance.
language restricting digital billboards to "arterial roadways" of four or
more lanes, the company was nonetheless entitled to maintain a digital
billboard on a smaller, collector street because the arterial roadway
restriction could be read to include collector streets in the definition of
"arterial roadways." The other company argued that this construction
failed to effectuate the legislative intent to restrict digital billboards to
larger roadways.9 4 The appellate court reviewed the traditional
canons of statutory construction and emphasized that these general
principles equally apply to zoning ordinances." The court noted the
clear distinction between collector streets and arterial roads shown
throughout the sign code and correspondingly observed that accepting
the first company's definition "would collapse a distinction otherwise
carefully drawn throughout the sign ordinances."' 96 The court refused
to apply a construction leading to such "unreasonable or absurd
consequences not contemplated by the legislature," and held in favor of
the second company.'
Lest one think Golden Isles Outdoor, LLC an anomaly, the court of
appeals issued Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm
In Southern States, a
Property Owners Ass'n"'8 the following day.

property owners' association filed suit against a landfill developer and
a county to halt the development of a proposed landfill. Among other
arguments, the association contended that even if the developer had a

vested right to build a landfill, this right lapsed pursuant to the terms

191. Id. at 37, 762 S.E.2d at 440.
192. Id. at 38, 762 S.E.2d at 441.
193. 331 Ga. App. 494, 771 S.E.2d 173 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 415 (2015).
194. Id. at 495-96, 498, 771 S.E.2d at 175-76, 177.
195. Id. at 496-99, 771 S.E.2d at 176-78.
196. Id. at 497, 498, 771 S.E.2d at 176-77, 177-78.
197. Id. at 498, 771 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting Staley v. State, 284 Ga. 873, 873-74, 672
S.E.2d 615, 616 (2009)).
198. 331 Ga. App. 878, 769 S.E.2d 823 (2015), reconsiderationdenied (Apr. 9, 2015).
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of the zoning ordinance then in effect.' 99 The court of appeals reaffirmed the application of traditional principles of statutory interpretation
to a county zoning ordinance.200 According to the plain meaning of the
ordinance in question, the landfill developer's vested right to operate a
landfill lapsed where the developer failed to commence the nonconforming use within a year.2 01
X.

A.

ZONING

Standing

Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Buckler202 marked the fourth appearance
in the court of appeals of the long-running litigation regarding a
proposed subdivision development in the historic Druid Hills area of
DeKalb County. At issue was the DeKalb County Planning Commission's approval, of the developers' sketch plat. A neighborhood association and two of its individual members (collectively the Association)
challenged the plat approval by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. The
Association voluntarily dismissed the first petition without prejudice and
refiled a second petition six months later. The trial court authorized the
second petition as a proper renewal action, but granted the developers'

motion to dismiss because the Association lacked standing.2 03
Regarding the propriety of the renewal action, the court of appeals

rejected the developers' contention that the Association's alleged lack of
standing-a concept implicating the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction-meant the first petition was void and not renewable.2 0 4

The court of appeals concluded the second action was a proper renewal
action under

O.C.G.A.

§ 9-2-61(c),

20 5

holding that "even when

a

plaintiff's original action suffered from a defect of subject matter
jurisdiction, such as a lack of standing, it was renewable as long as the

plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice."2 06
The court reversed the dismissal of the petition on the Association's
alleged lack of standing, concluding the developers had not properly
preserved the issue before the Planning Commission. 2 07 Relying on its

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 878, 769 S.E.2d at 824.
Id. at 884, 769 S.E.2d at 827-28.
Id. at 884-85, 769 S.E.2d at 828.
328 Ga. App. 485, 760 S.E.2d 194 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 867 (2014).
Id. at 486, 487, 487-88, 760 S.E.2d at 196, 197-98.
Id. at 489, 760 S.E.2d at 199.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(c) (2007).
Buckler, 328 Ga. App. at 490, 760 S.E.2d at 199.
Id. at 491, 760 S.E.2d at 200 (footnote omitted).
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prior decision in RCG Properties v. City of Atlanta Board of Zoning
Adjustment,2 0 the court held that "the superior court was bound by
the record as developed before the [Planning Commission], and could not
consider the issue of the Association's standing when that issue had not
been raised before the Planning Commission."209
B.

Adoption of Zoning Ordinance and Associated Maps
210
Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Co., LLC

highlights the importance of precision in adopting zoning ordinances and
associated maps that apply zoning classifications to specific properties.
A developer sought a writ of mandamus against Newton County and
several of its officials, claiming the absence of contemporaneously
adopted zoning maps invalidated the County's May 21, 1985 zoning
ordinance.2 1 1 The Georgia Supreme Court stated, "These [zoning]
maps are an integral part of the zoning ordinance. The ordinance
identifies the lands to which its various zoning classifications apply only
by reference to the maps, and without the maps, the zoning ordinance
would be too indefinite and vague to satisfy the requirements of due
process."212
While the record indicated that Newton County adopted zoning maps
on July 2, 1985, these maps were insufficient to save the ordinance.21 3
The court held that there was no evidence that the May 21st zoning
ordinance was reenacted in conjunction with the July 2nd adoption of
the maps or that the County purported to adopt those maps in any
existing zoning ordinance. 214 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the developer.215
XI.
A.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

Respondeat Superior, Negligent Hiring, and Negligent Retention

In Graham v. City of Duluth," the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined whether the City was liable under the theories of respondeat

208. 260 Ga. App. 355, 579 S.E.2d 782 (2003).
209. Buckler, 328 Ga. App. at 495, 760 S.E.2d at 202.
210. 296 Ga. 18, 764 S.E.2d 830 (2014).
211. Id. at 18, 764 S.E.2d at 831.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 18, 764 S.E.2d at 831-32.
214. Id. at 20, 764 S.E.2d at 832.
215. Id. at 21, 764 S.E.2d at 833.
216. 328 Ga. App. 496, 759 S.E.2d 645 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 23, 2014),
cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 32 (2015).
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superior, negligent hiring, and negligent retention for injuries caused
when an intoxicated off-duty police officer-with a previous history of
alcohol abuse, involuntary commitment, and belligerency with a service
weapon-attacked a citizen and another officer.217
The plaintiff
alleged that the City was vicariously liable under a theory of negligent
hiring.1
The City's standard operating procedure in respect to pre-employment
investigatory actions was quite detailed, and the evidence reflected that
the officer tasked with conducting the investigation did not perform the
investigation in a thorough manner by failing to secure critical
information regarding this potential employee's background. 21 9 Based
upon evidence indicating a lapse in the background investigation, the
court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding
whether the City exercised ordinary care in conducting the background
investigation.2 2 0 Consequently, the court held that "[a] jury question
exists as to whether such information should have raised at least some
question as to [the officer in question's] suitability to be a police
officer."

B.

221

Borrowed Servant Doctrine

When an employee commits an act of negligence within the scope of
his or her employment, the employer is ordinarily liable for such
negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In Garden City v.
2 22
Herrera,
the Georgia Court of Appeals examined a widely recognized
exception to the theory of respondeat superior-the borrowed servant
rule.2 2 3 In Herrera, a conservator, Ann Herrera, brought a negligence
action against Garden City on behalf of an adult ward, Lisa Muse, who
was injured in an automobile accident with a Garden City police officer.
At the time of the accident, Garden City assigned the Garden City police
officer, Judd Robert West, to a multijurisdictional task force run by
Chatham County. 224
Georgia courts have deemed an employee to be a borrowed servant
when the party seeking to establish or avoid liability demonstrates the
following: (1) the borrowing employer had complete control and direction

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 496-97, 759 S.E.2d at 647.
Id.
Id. at 503-05, 759 S.E.2d at 651-52.
Id. at 505, 759 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 504-05, 759 S.E.2d at 652.
329 Ga. App. 756, 766 S.E.2d 150 (2014), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 109 (2015).
Id. at 756-57, 766 S.E.2d at 151-52.
Id.
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over the employee for the occasion; (2) the lending employer had no such
control; and (3) the borrowing employer had the exclusive right to
discharge the employee.2 25 It was undisputed that at the moment of
impact, the borrowed servant was driving to the location of a task force
operation at the direction of his task force supervisor. 2 6 The court
concluded that while Garden City retained the right to discharge West
from employment as a city police officer in general, the County held the
exclusive right to discharge the servant from his duties with the task
force at the time of the accident and reversed the trial court's denial of
the City's motion for summary judgment. 2 27 This finding provides
guidance to local governments participating in joint task force agreements with surrounding cities, counties, and those jurisdictions that
share employees with neighboring local governments.
C.

Employer-Employee Contracts and Breach of Contract

22 8
In DeKalb County v. Kirkland,
the court of appeals examined
whether DeKalb County's Code created a written employment contract
that guaranteed compensation for accrued time, waiving the County's
sovereign immunity for any action ex contractu. 229 The pertinent
DeKalb County Code provided that if the County granted compensatory
time, overtime-exempt employees had to use compensatory time within
one year and could not receive cash compensation for any unused
time. 23 0 The plaintiffs filed suit for breach of contract based on
DeKalb County's refusal to allow them to use their accrued compensatory time or provide compensation for that time in derogation of the
DeKalb County Code. 2 3 ' Rejecting this theory, the court held that the
pertinent DeKalb County Code section did not constitute a written
employment contract between the County and the plaintiffs that would
23
defeat the County's sovereign immunity.

2

Only six days after issuing Kirkland the court of appeals reviewed the
City of Stockbridge's authority to unilaterally extend a City Administra2 33
tor's employment contract. In City of Stockbridge v. Stuart,
the
mayor challenged the city council's extension of the city administrator's

225. Id. at 758-59, 766 S.E.2d at 152-53 (citing Six Flags Over Ga., Inc. v. Hill, 247 Ga.
375, 377, 276 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1981)).
226. Id. at 760, 766 S.E.2d at 154.
227. Id. at 760-61, 763, 766 S.E.2d at 154, 156.
228. 329 Ga. App. 262, 764 S.E.2d 867 (2014).
229. Id. at 265, 266, 764 S.E.2d at 870.
230. Id. at 263, 764 S.E.2d at 869; see DEKALB CouNTY, GA. CODE § 20-161(c) (2015).
231. Kirkland, 329 Ga. App. at 265, 266, 764 S.E.2d at 870.
232. Id. at 266, 764 S.E.2d at 870, 871.
233. 329 Ga. App. 323, 765 S.E.2d 16 (2014).
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employment contract. The mayor argued the city council lacked
authority to unilaterally extend the city administrator's employment
contract with the City of Stockbridge beyond the previously agreed to
term by the mayor and the city council. The mayor argued any
extension of the employment contract beyond the existing contract term
was ultra vires and void.23 4
Agreeing with the mayor, the court of appeals held that while the City
had the power to enter into contracts with private persons under the
City's charter, the position of City Administrator only existed by virtue
of the mayor's specific delegation of his authority and power to appoint
city officers and employees."' Therefore, any of the city council's effort
to lengthen the city administrator's contract of employment without the
mayor's approval constituted an impermissible and unauthorized
extension in contravention of the charter.236
XII.

BOND VALIDATION

In Greene County Development Authority v. State of Georgia23 7 the
Georgia Supreme Court considered a challenge to the validation of the
Greene County Development Authority's proposal of certain revenue
bonds through an intergovernmental agreement with Greene County
regarding the "revenue."2 38 Lake Oconee Academy, Inc., a non-profit
corporation that operated a public charter school in Greene County, was
the ultimate beneficiary of the bonds pursuant to a contract with the
Greene County Board of Education.2 " In this case, however, the
Greene County Board of Education had little to no involvement in the
underlying transaction; rather, the Board of Commissioners and the
Development Authority were the primary participants. Several Greene
County residents intervened to object to the bond validation, and the
trial court declined validation.2 4 o Specifically, the trial court found
that the Development Authority's proposal was not "sound, feasible, and
reasonable."2 4 ' In affirming the trial court, the supreme court took
pains to emphasize that the trial court's finding was not required, but
permitted, based on the record, explaining, "whether a proposal to issue
bonds is sound, feasible, and reasonable is a question for the trial court,

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 325, 327, 765 S.E.2d at 18, 19.
Id. at 327, 765 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 328, 765 S.E.2d at 19-20.
296 Ga. 725, 770 S.E.2d 595 (2015).
Id. at 726, 770 S.E.2d at 596.
Id. at 725-26, 770 S.E.2d at 596.
Id. at 726, 770 S.E.2d at 596.
Id.
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and its findings about soundness, feasibility, and reasonableness must
be sustained on appeal if there is any evidence to support them."2 4 2
XIII.

MANDAMUS

In Hansen v. DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors 243 the Georgia
Supreme Court examined two questions in connection with property tax
assessments: (1) whether the plaintiffs properly brought their action in
trial court seeking mandamus nisi and (2) whether the Georgia Open
Records Act 2 44 applies to information sought pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-306(d) 245 by a taxpayer.2 4 1
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306(d), taxpayers may request information and documents that were reviewed in making a property tax
assessment from the county board of tax assessors, and the board shall
provide the information within ten business days. 4 ' The plaintiffs in
Hansen, a total of thirty-one DeKalb County taxpayers, sought certain
information from the DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors (Board)
concerning their 2012 property tax assessments pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-306(d). 2 48
The Board provided responses to the plaintiffs'
requests on two occasions, but the plaintiffs asserted those responses
were "insufficiently specific" because they did not provide the "precise
information" sought.2 4'
The plaintiffs then requested a recorded
meeting with the Board's Secretary and Chief Appraiser to discuss the
document requests and the Board's responses; however, their request
was denied. 25 0 The plaintiffs filed a petition for mandamus with the
trial court, seeking an order directing the Board to "directly, fully, and
truthfully" respond to each document request and meet with the
The plaintiffs also sought
plaintiffs to discuss the responses. 251
penalties, under the Open Records Act based on the Board's responses,
and attorney fees.252 The trial court denied the mandamus nisi and
the supreme court agreed.2 5 3

242. Id.
243. 295 Ga. 385, 761 S.E.2d 35 (2014).
244. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 to -77 (2013 & Supp. 2015).
245. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306(d) (2010 & Supp. 2015).
246. Hansen, 295 Ga. at 385, 761 S.E.2d at 36.
247. Id. at 386, 761 S.E.2d at 37; see also O.C.G.A. § 48-5-301(d)(1).
248. Hansen, 295 Ga. at 385-86, 761 S.E.2d at 36.
249. Id. at 386, 761 S.E.2d at 36.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 386, 761 S.E.2d at 36-37.
252. Id. at 386, 761 S.E.2d at 37.
253. Id. at 386-87, 761 S.E.2d at 37.
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The court explained that "[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy
available only where a litigant seeks to compel a public official to
perform an act or fulfill a duty that is required by law," and a prerequisite to such remedy is "a 'clear legal right' to the relief being
sought."2 5 4 In Hansen, there was no dispute the Board provided two
responses to the plaintiffs' information requests.2 5 5 According to the
court, that was all O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306(d) required, and the plaintiffs'
further demands for supplementation and a recorded meeting with the
Board were not mandated by the statute.2 5 6 As such, the plaintiffs did
not have a clear legal right to the relief sought, and the court held the
request for mandamus was "unsupportable as a matter of law." 25 7

254. Id. at 387, 761 S.E.2d at 37.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.

